


PLAN of the ORDER of BATTLE of the ARMY Commanded by EARL CORNWALLIS, May 2nd 1791.

Major Gen^l Medows, 2nd in Command.



STAFF		AIDS DE CAMP		MAJORS of BRIGADE & Q ^{rs} MASTERS of D ^{os}	
Adj ^t General of the Army	Lt Col. Malcolm	Lord Cornwallis	Capt. Holdane	Cavalry	Capt ^t Dallas Lt Dalmonte
D ^o Kings Troops	Lt Col. Roje		Capt ^t Kydd	Artillery	Lt Johnstone
Q ^r Master General	Lt Col. Richardson		Capt ^t Apsley	Kings Troops	Lt Nightingale
D ^o Kings Troops	Lt Col. Harris		Lt Col. Martin	2 Brigade	Lt S ^t G. Laith B ^t
Sec ^y Comm ^r in Chief	Lt Col. Ross		Capt ^t Madan	3 ^d	Capt ^t Douglas Lt M ^c Doual
D ^o Gen ^l Medows	Lt Col. Harris		Capt ^t Robinson	4	Capt ^t Turing Lt J ^r Graham
Deputy Adj ^t General	Major Gore	Gen ^l Medows	Major Hart	5	Capt ^t A. Grant Lt Gibbings
D ^o Kings Troops	Capt ^t Dirom		Capt ^t Macaulay	6	Capt ^t Cosby Lt C. Campbell
D ^o Bengal	Major Scott		Capt ^t Bordu	7	Lt Cranston Lt Rand
Deputy Q ^r M ^r General	Major Smart	Lt Col. Floyd	Capt ^t Forbes	Captains of Guides	
Paymaster Army	G. Hoare Esq ^r	Lt Col. Stuart	Lt Young	Capt ^t Alexander Beaton	
D ^o Kings	W. Burke		Hart	Alexander Allan	
Commissary	T. Kingscote Esq ^r		Wilkes	Com ^d Pioneers	
Chief Engineer	Lt Col. P. Roje	Lt Col. Maxwell	Capt ^t Clar	Lt Dowse	
			Agnew	Lt Lannan	
		Col. Duff	Lt Cranch	Persian Interpreter Cherry Esq ^r	
		Lt Col. Ross	Lt M ^c Kenzie	Surgeon General C. L. Lucas Esq ^r	

Total Force.

1 Reg ^t European Cavalry
7 Reg ^t European Infantry
2 1/2 Batt ^{ns} Artillery
34 Squadrons Native Cavalry
17 Battalions Native Infantry
50 6 th
2 3 th Brafs Field Train
8 Cohorns
8 18 th
2 24 th Iron Battering Guns
4 12 th


Total Ordnance 74 Boucher a feu.

NARRATIVE


OF THE

OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY

IN INDIA, &c.



NARRATIVE
OF THE
OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY
IN INDIA,
From the 21st April to the 16th July, 1791;
WITH A
PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION ON THE
15th OF MAY,
NEAR
SERINGAPATAM.




LONDON:
PRINTED FOR W. FADEN, GEOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY,
CHARING-CROSS.
1792.

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CP 16/12/77		

SKETCH OF THE POSITIONS of the British Army And the MYSOREAN ARMY Commanded

In the ACTION of the 15th of May 1791.

by Cap. P. A. Agnew Aid de Camp to
& formerly Aid de Camp to Col. L.



Scale of four Miles.

London Published by W. Faden Geographer to the King.


Army Commanded by *E. ARL CORNWALLIS*,
 Commanded by *SULTAN TIPPOO SAHEB*,
 1791. near *SERINGAPATAM*.

Camp to Col: Maxwell
 up to Col: Fullerton



Four Miles.

by the King, Charing Cross, March 15th 1792.



NARRATIVE, &c.

THE supplies of provisions and stores which had been collected for the army at Amboor, with a reinforcement of four battalions of Sepoys from the southern countries, and the Bengal regiment of cavalry, under the command of Colonel Oldham, having joined the camp at Vencatighery on the 21st of April, the grand army moved on the 22d towards Bangalore, on its route to the capital,—Seringapatam. The march to Bangalore was productive of nothing worthy of notice, if we except the conduct of our Nizamite allies, who, in some slight skirmishes with the enemy's horse, gave us but little reason to hope for much material benefit from their assistance. Tippoo's army kept at a short distance from us; his detached parties hovered round us to watch our motions; and while we lay at Bangalore, making the necessary arrangements for approaching his capital, he remained in the neighbourhood of Severndroog; from whence he moved to Seringapatam by the shortest road, as soon as he was certain that our army was moving to the same point.

At Bangalore we found that our means of conveyance for provisions and stores were extremely inadequate to the quantity of both, which it was thought necessary to convey: the bullock contract has always been considered as a business of great mismanagement, and in this instance was very deficient. The supposed state of European politics made it necessary to lose no time in bringing our Indian disputes to a conclusion, and to use every possible means to obviate those difficulties which seemed to

obstruct our progress to the capital of Mysore. The individuals of the army were requested to contribute to this grand object, by a temporary reduction of camp equipage, and thereby to supply the public service with their private cattle. The enormous proportion of baggage and followers of an Indian army, by these means, became a public benefit, and nearly the whole of the shot necessary for the siege, was carried by this voluntary, and highly honourable, assistance of the officers and soldiers. The Nizam's troops also carried, for a small reward, 5000 eighteen pound shot, equal to about eight hundred bullock loads. It likewise afforded cattle for the conveyance of a considerable supply of provisions; and in order to transport as much as possible of this very necessary article of equipment, the *munition de bouche*, with as much grain, was given gratis, from the stores in Bangalore, to each Sepoy, as he chose to carry. The corps on an average taking twenty days provisions.

After leaving a garrison consisting of 2000 native troops, and 200 Europeans, exclusive of the sick, we were enabled, by these aids, to move from Bangalore on the 3d of May, with 15 battering guns, provision in store for 20 days for the fighting men, and an army consisting of one regiment of *European*, and five of *native cavalry*, seven regiments of *European infantry*, ten battalions of *Coast*, and seven of *Bengal Sepoys*, 52 field pieces, and nearly three complete battalions of artillery; the largest regular force that ever was assembled in India. To this, 16,000 irregular horse may be added, whom we expected to cover our foragers from insult, and assist in collecting provisions, although we did not reckon on much material advantage from their efforts in a general action.

It may not be improper here to recur to the general situation of our affairs, as a clue to a fair and unbiassed investigation of the propriety of moving forward to an attack of such importance, before we were perfectly prepared. Every account from Europe had led us to conclude that a war

with Spain was inevitable; and it was supposed that France would, of course, be involved in the contest. In such an event, natural policy, as well as former connection, would have pointed out to the French the measure of assisting Tippoo, as the readiest mode of distressing us in India; and if their distracted condition permitted their taking an active part, by attacking our settlements here, while internal wars employed our army, they were by no means secure from insult. It became, therefore, an object of the highest importance to conclude the war without delay, either by the total subversion of the hostile power, or by negotiating a peace on advantageous terms. Our movement towards the capital was the first step to either of these objects. Tippoo's embarrassed situation, with all the powers of India leagued against him, the recent loss of Bangalore, still fresh in the minds of the people, and the dread of what might happen, if his capital was once attacked, might well be supposed to influence the Sultan to think of peace, and even to purchase it by large concessions, rather than risk the utter ruin of his empire by an obstinate perseverance in a system of hostility. This was the more likely, as in reply to a message sent by Tippoo, while his army was in the Carnatic, he was told his proposals would only be received at the gates of Seringapatam.—If, on the contrary, he remained determined for war, we had every thing to hope from the magnitude of our force, especially as Seringapatam was said to be far inferior in strength to Bangalore.

From what we had lately seen, no expectation was entertained of Tippoo's army meeting ours in the field; and if he confined it within the walls, or even the island of Seringapatam, their numbers would rather take from, than add to, his means of resistance. We had in store a certain quantity of provisions, and had received accounts that General Abercromby had ascended the Gauts from the Malabar coast, and had taken post at the Poodicherrum Pass, at the same time that our army mounted by the Pass

of Muglee (20th of February), having with him a battering train, the 73d, 75th, and 77th regiments, one battalion of European, and five of native infantry, belonging to the Bombay establishment. From thence the army proceeded to Periapatam, about 30 miles S W of Seringapatam, where they arrived on the 16th of May.

Tippoo had invariably followed the policy of his father Hyder, in destroying the country for several miles on each side of the road by which he expected our approach; and the inhabitants of this tract had been driven to the hills, and their villages burnt, to prevent our meeting with assistance from them. Hence it was thought more adviseable to move by the route of Cankanelly,* than by the shorter road of Chinapatam and Ramgery,† which had been prepared in this manner for our reception. Our intelligence, a word which in this country is generally synonymous to misinformation, also led us to expect a more open country in this direction, and consequently a better chance of meeting with grass or grain in a state of vegetation, which Tippoo's troops would not have time to destroy. In this we were greatly deceived; the road was bad, through a thick jungle for many miles; and, to add to our difficulties, heavy rains came on when we reached Sultanpetta.

These unexpected impediments prevented our arrival near Seringapatam, till the 13th of May; and here we found, that from some mismanagement in the provision department, and the mortality among our cattle, occasioned by bad weather and want of forage, much of the stock of rice on which we depended was not forthcoming. The Nizam's troops were so much in dread of Tippoo's cavalry, that they never ventured beyond our picquets, and instead of procuring forage and provisions, served only to consume the gleanings of the country, which, had we not been

* 95 Miles.

† About 80 miles.

encumbered with their assistance, would have maintained our cattle and followers. The wants of the latter description of people brought on us another misfortune. The Sepoys, for whose families no provision had been made, trusting to those supplies they had formerly been accustomed to find by their own industry, had shared with them what had been given for their own subsistence, and instead of having, as was supposed, provisions for ten days remaining in their possession, many were in absolute want. Punishing the men for thus misapplying their stock, would not remedy the evil; provisions were therefore served out to them from the public store, at half allowance. In this state our army arrived within sight of Seringapatam; no overtures of a pacific tendency had been made by the Sultan; and we saw, to our great surprise, his numerous army drawn out, entrenched, and strongly posted on the north side of the Caverry, to oppose our farther progress. The accounts given by the deserters from his army agreed, in stating it to be his determination to try the event of a battle; if defeated, to retire within the walls of his capital, and defend it to the last. His mother and all his family were undoubtedly still in the place, and he had summoned all his forces from every quarter of his empire, to make one great effort to decide his fate. The night of the 15th brought us intelligence (via Bombay) of the arrangement of our European disputes; and on the morning of the 14th news arrived of the fall of Darwar, which had long been besieged by the army of our Mahratta allies, assisted by a detachment from Bombay.

Camp, Caniambaddy, May 25, 1791.

To give a detail of our progress here would neither interest nor amuse; a dull narrative of fatiguing marches, without one event to render them interesting, or vary the scene; which exhibited nothing but a country, in some parts fine, as much as possible destroyed by fire to im-

pede our progress through it. On the 13th instant we arrived in sight of Seringapatam, and encamped at Arakeery, a ruined fort, about six miles from the island; our left, which extended to the river, was considerably nearer. A tract of low swampy ground extended along our front, bounded on the north by several hills, to which the right of our line was placed. Beyond the swamp, and immediately in our front, Tippoo's line was drawn up, strongly posted in an opening between the hills and our right, and another range which covered his rear. Several batteries appeared to be thrown up to defend the approach, and, as we afterwards discovered, a water-course formed by art considerably above the common level of the country, which ran along the edge of the low ground between our armies, had been converted into an intrenchment to defend his front. The 14th was employed in endeavours to make a bad ford across the Caverry practicable for guns, to enable us to form a junction with General Abercromby's army; but the depth of the river at this place (Arakeery), and the uneven bottom of its very rocky bed, rendered it unadvisable to attempt the passage. On the evening of this day, private orders were issued to the officers commanding corps, to have their troops under arms at 11 o'clock at night, to be then in readiness to march without baggage or followers of any kind. The intention of this order was to move by night round the hills on our right, and attack the enemy in their camp at day-break. Our own tents, heavy guns, and stores remained as they were; and three Sepoy corps from the line, the infantry of the reserve, part of the cavalry, all the picquets of the army, and ordinary guards of camp, were left under Colonel Duff for their protection. The night was unfavourable in the extreme; heavy rain falling without intermission till near day-light. This circumstance rendered the roads bad; darkness prevented the troops from seeing the tract of those who preceded them, and some misconception of orders added to the con-

fusion and delay. The cattle at the guns, weak from former want of forage, were exhausted by fatigue before they were out of camp, and although every exertion was made by the troops who assisted in dragging them on, day broke upon us just as the rear of our line had passed the picquets of our right. Lord Cornwallis, however, determined to persevere in his plan of attack, though his actions were no longer concealed by the darkness of the night. The army proceeded on its march, by the shortest route ; and at sun-rise, on moving round the end of the hills, the enemy's line was seen from a rising ground exactly in the same position they had occupied the day before. Very low ground, intersected by a deep nulla, or ravine, ran along their front ; but a height beyond the nulla seemed to present a favourable opportunity of attacking their left flank with advantage. The 1st European brigade, which led our column of march, moved on to possess it. At the same time a body of the enemy's infantry, with guns, moved from their left, as we then imagined, to escape to Seringapatam, and their whole force appeared in motion. This body of troops, commanded by Kummer ul Deen, turning suddenly to the right, pushed for the height towards which our troops were advancing, and, from the superiority of their cattle, gained its summit first ; but our leading corps prevented them from occupying another strong ridge, which, although lower than the first, was of material consequence. The body of the enemy, which possessed the height, immediately formed across the head of our column, threw a shower of rockets, and opened several guns, which enfiladed the column as it advanced within 500 yards. The rocks, which formed the lower ridge which our troops had possessed, sheltered them in some degree from the fire ; and under cover of them, one regiment formed a front to the height, while the other corps of the brigade formed a line to the left at right angles with the leading corps, and fronting the enemy's main body, which was now drawn up on that side, in two lines, fronting

towards us, occupying the high ground round the foot of the hills; and so disposed, as to skirt the edge of the low ground between them and our army; their artillery was posted on commanding spots in different parts of their line. The difficulty of passing the nulla occasioned some intervals in the column of march. The corps of the right wing, as fast as they came up, formed a line to their left, extending from the ground we first moved to occupy, as far as the nulla.

At this period a small body of the enemy's cavalry made a resolute charge on our unformed line; they were steadily received by the Bengal Sepoys, against whom their attack was pointed, and repulsed by a very heavy and well directed fire of musquetry and grape. Part of the left wing, as it came up, formed on the right of the regiment which fronted the height under cover of the rocks, and the remaining corps were disposed in a second and third line, covering the rear of this, and that already formed to the left. The cavalry remained drawn up in the rear, without passing the nulla, and in readiness to oppose any of the enemy's cavalry, who might attempt to molest our rear battalions in crossing it. Thus situated, for the alterations of disposition which took place from time to time were very trifling, the army remained for a considerable time, while the Commander in Chief was fixing on his plan of attack, unavoidably exposed to a very heavy, and well directed cannonade, from a numerous artillery, and which, from the advantageous position of the enemy, enfiladed both our lines. At length, the division on the right, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, consisting of the 52d regiment, and three battalions of Coast Sepoys, sustained by the 71st regiment, was ordered to drive the enemy's force from the height, which we had originally moved to seize. This corps advanced rapidly under a heavy fire of cannon, musquetry and rockets. The enemy's infantry stood firm till ours was very near them; but, at last, they broke, and run down the hill, which was a

very steep bank. Their guns had been drawn off as our troops advanced, but three of them were still at the foot of it; these were immediately taken by the Europeans, whose eagerness at that moment could not be restrained, although a very considerable body of cavalry, which threatened the left of this division of our troops, rendered their situation extremely hazardous, as the plain below was favourable to the active operations of the horse. The men at the guns defended them desperately, and some individuals of the cavalry rushed through our troops, and were killed at the muzzles of the guns, in a desperate attempt to save them. The success of Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell's attack was the signal for the left division, under General Medows, to advance on the main force of the enemy, a movement which could not with prudence be attempted till then, as the body of their troops which we had first dislodged, would have flanked General Medows' corps in its advance. As this corps proceeded to the eastward of the hills, Colonel Maxwell, leaving two battalions of Sepoys to maintain the height, kept up the connection of the lines, by moving with the remainder of his division to the left; driving the enemy from a rock, to which part of their force had retreated, and being joined by the first battalion of Sepoys, and the 72d regiment *, pursued the enemy along the hills (on their western side) till that regiment, at one o'clock, took possession of a redoubt built on the summit of the highest hill, immediately above the N. E. end of the island, and commanding the pagoda hill, on which was a considerable work completely finished. This work, which contained five guns, and many Europeans, might also have been taken with ease, but the Commander in Chief did not choose to risk the lives of men in attacking a place, which it was at any time in his power to seize, till he saw a necessity of possessing it. While the division on the right was thus employed, General Medows at-

* These corps had been detached from the left division to oppose a body of cavalry which menaced their flank.

tacked the main body of the enemy, and obliged them to fall back. Their infantry stood uncommonly well, and even advanced a little on our line, to cover the retreat of their guns. Our small corps of cavalry, under Colonel Floyd, charged the flank of their first line, and broke it; but coming on the front of their second line, posted on very strong ground, they were received by a heavy fire of musquetry, which obliged them to retreat; some guns were taken in the charge, but necessarily abandoned in retiring. Some partial charges were made by part of our cavalry on that of the enemy, but none of consequence; and several officers, who were more forward in the charge than perhaps was prudent, were wounded*. The horses were disabled from want of food, and constant service, few of them being able to canter; and, considering their situation, and the badness of the preceding night, it was matter of surprise to every one who saw them perform what they did. The infantry pressing forward, continued to drive the enemy before them, who rallied several times on advantageous ground, and defended their positions with much more obstinacy than was expected from them. On this account, the Commander in Chief restrained the ardour of the troops, who were eager to push forward to take guns, not choosing where success was certain, by pursuing a regular plan to put any thing to the hazard by an opposite conduct. One gun only was taken on the left. The enemy retired in great confusion, followed by our line, towards the island; the batteries from which opened their guns, to cover and assist their retreat. So complete was our victory, that even the Nizam's troops, whose irregularity can only be equalled by their cowardice, pushed forward at last, and though cautious of advancing far enough to charge the enemy, while formed to oppose them, they made great havock amongst those already wounded by our troops, and picking up the standards, arms, &c. which were scattered in great profusion over the

* Cornet Patterson, 19th Light Dragoons, was cut to pieces.

field; boasted much of the feats they had performed, and displayed these trophies as proofs of their valour and success.

Our line remained formed till the dusk of the evening, when we encamped on the ground the enemy had occupied the preceding night, to which our camp equipage was brought at a late hour from our former ground. The picquets from camp, under Captain Campbell of the 74th, advanced during the action to some rocks near the bank of the river, where they kept the enemy in check.

Our loss amounted to about 110 Europeans, and 350 natives, killed and wounded. Four officers were killed, and 19 wounded, two of whom are since dead. The loss of the enemy is not exactly known, but it must have exceeded ours considerably. The day after the action, Lord Cornwallis sent to offer the Sultan permission to carry off his wounded men, and bury the dead, which he accepted with thanks. On examining Tippoo's position, we found it to have been extremely strong towards our former encampments; several batteries had been prepared, and the approach was so difficult, that the success of an attack from that quarter would have been very doubtful indeed.

From the hills we had a fine view of Seringapatam. The island is surrounded by an intrenchment, and batteries, seemingly well constructed, are raised to defend the passage of the river. The fort is large and irregular. Several outworks, in the European stile are on the land-side, but those parts washed by the river appear to be in the old Indian manner of fortification. It is surrounded by a double wall, and contains many handsome buildings. The rest of the island is taken up with some neat gardens, and an extensive pettah (or suburb), in the open parts of which, and on the glacis of the fort, Tippoo encamped part of his army, the rest were on the south side of the river. The island was so full of men and cattle, that shot thrown into it at random, could not fail to do

serious mischief. Our battering train joined us on the 16th, and on the 18th the army moved to the northwest of the island, and encamped at the foot of a remarkable rock called Yirdimally, on the Milgotah road. The consequences of our want of forage were now severely felt. Our bullocks, in a march of six miles, were quite exhausted, and the guns and stores required all the exertions of the troops to bring them forward. After a day's halt we again moved to this place, where there is a ford across the Cavery, about eight miles above the town. This march (the 20th) was extremely fatiguing. The heavy guns were almost entirely dragged by the troops, and four battalions were employed on the same duty with the store department. The rains had set in decidedly, and provisions for the followers, and even for the fighting men, were become scarce. The advices from General Abercromby informed us, that owing to the rains it was impossible to bring up supplies of provisions from the Malabar Coast till after the monsoon, and the quantity he had with him was barely sufficient for the use of his own army. The 21st was employed in repairing the ford for the passage of guns; and on the morning of that day a large detachment, said to be commanded by Syed Saib, passed in our view along the south side of the river, on their march towards Periapatam, where the Bombay army was encamped. The season being so far advanced, and our supplies of provisions so deficient, the measure of beginning a siege of such importance as that of Seringapatam would have been absurd, and that of crossing the river to join General Abercromby equally so, as when effected it could answer no one useful purpose. Thus obliged by necessity to abandon the enterprize, and from want of cattle unable to carry off the immense train of artillery and stores we had brought with us, without subjecting the army to exertions and fatigue, to which the intrinsic value of the guns and stores bore no proportion, the Commander in Chief therefore determined to destroy them, which was

effected on the 22d by bursting the guns, rendering the powder useless, and burying the shot. Orders were at the same time sent to General Abercromby to move down the pass with all expedition, and we remained here to prevent the enemy from moving in great force to harass his march.

On the 24th, two brigades crossed the river, to carry on the feint still further, with a view to induce Tippoo to recal the detachment already sent against him. The river rising fast from the unremitting rains that fell for some days, the detachment recrossed, as their situation appeared extremely hazardous. Lord Cornwallis in a very handsome manner explained to the troops his reasons for destroying the train, and gave them hopes of renewing our prospects after the monsoon.

We now know the situation and strength of the place, and the nature of the country which surrounds it, of which we were before entirely ignorant; we know the utmost of the difficulties we have to encounter; and when we again move forward, we shall be perfectly provided against them. Till then the Sultan has a short reprieve, and we cannot believe his troops will ever again meet ours in the field with that apparent steadiness they shewed on the 15th instant. They had then every inducement to exertion: rewards had been distributed among them with a liberal hand; promises were made of still greater recompence in the event of victory; and their master had used every effort to persuade them that nothing but confidence was wanting to insure their success. No argument of religious prejudice had been neglected, and every endeavour had been made to rouse them, from personal and family attachment, to exert themselves in their sovereign's cause. Their position was strong by nature, and strengthened by art; their numbers enormous, and in the event of ill success, their retreat was certain. After all, though they stood better than we have ever before seen them do, yet they did not

stand well ; theirs was not an active exertion of valour, but a passive negligence of danger. It proved their want of real discipline :—and their hesitation as our troops approached them, evidently marked the contention in their minds between individual bravery, and the want of mutual confidence in each other. Their ill success, and the loss they sustained, which of course fell heaviest on those who were the last to retreat, will prevent them hereafter from engaging in a contest, to which repeated experience has proved them utterly unequal.

On the 26th of May, we moved from our encampment at Caniambaddy, our slow march bearing strong testimony to the reduced and weak state of our means and conveyance ; even the light field-pieces required the assistance of the battalions to which they were attached to move them forward. At the close of this march, a body of horse appeared on our baggage flank ; and while some corps were forming to oppose them, some men, to our great surprise, rode into our line with information that this party belonged to the van of the Mahratta army, which was within three coss, on its way to join us. This was the first intelligence we had of their approach ; and although forty letters had been dispatched from them before they quitted Darwar, to apprize the Commander in Chief of their intentions, yet so closely was our camp surrounded by Tippoo's horse, that not one of the number had reached us. Two days after the receipt of this intelligence, we moved towards Milgotah, on the road to which place the united armies of Hurry Punt and Perseram Bhow encamped close to ours. They brought with them a large bazar, well supplied with provisions, and as the country in their rear was open, it was probable the supply might continue. Their force, besides three battalions of Bombay Sepoys, consisted of about 40,000 horse, a number of irregular infantry, 25 pieces of cannon of all sorts and sizes, but so unwieldy and ill mounted, that we should have judged them unfit for service.

The country they had passed from Darwar to this place, with the exception of some few hill-forts, was perfectly in their possession, and these places, as well as Bedenore were surrounded by large detachments of their horse, which they had left to watch the motions of the garrisons, and prevent them from interrupting the supplies of grain, &c. coming to their camp. The chiefs lamented the destruction of our guns, as they said they could have supplied us with provisions, and were all eager for a vigorous prosecution of the war. Their horse, though in appearance inferior to the Nizam's, had not that dread of Tippoo's cavalry, and their numbers gave them confidence.

Their arrival changed the face of affairs entirely; we were no longer obliged, from want of provisions, to move immediately from our situation, and Tippoo being confined to Seringapatam and its vicinity, in his turn suffered by the scarcity he had created to distress us. The Mahrattas possessed the road by which he had trusted to receive supplies, and there was every probability that in a short time his cavalry, like ours, would be nearly extinct, dying for want of forage. Of the mighty empire which a few months before had bowed with implicit obedience to his will, the province of Bedenore alone remained unravaged by the armies of one or other of the powers in league against the son of Hyder; and no part of the country could with propriety be called his, but the small portion inclosed within the walls of his forts, and protected by their guns. In every former war, the inhabitants who quitted their villages to avoid plunder, had found in the hills a safe refuge for the short period of Mahratta incursion; or if their force remained longer than usual, retired to some other province which was out of the reach of molestation. Our mode of warfare, by keeping possession of the country, instead of destroying and hastily quitting it, deprived them of this resource; unable to exist in the mountains, and prevented by the universal inroads of a variety of hos-

tile powers from finding an asylum in any part of the Mysore dominions, they were reduced to fly from famine to the Carnatic, and there repay, with interest, the advantages which Hyder's country had borrowed from ours, by driving off its inhabitants during the last war.

It having been determined by Lord Cornwallis and the Mahratta chiefs, to move to a more plentiful country, till we should be prepared, and the season favourable, for renewing the attack upon the capital; we decamped on the 6th of June from the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and proceeding by short marches, making frequent halts, and taking possession of some small hill forts as we passed, arrived on the 11th of July at Bangalore. On our march we reconnoitered Severndroog, near which place we encamped for some days. We found it so strong by nature, that judging its importance to bear no proportion to the loss of time which must be employed to reduce it, we made no attempt to gain possession of it. Few of these fortified rocks are in themselves of much importance, and must all fall, of course, when the capital is taken.

After throwing the sick of the army into Bangalore, and taking out such provisions as we wanted (a large supply of which having lately been sent there, by the very active and meritorious exertions of Captain Alexander Read), the remains of our cavalry were sent to the Carnatic to recruit; and on the 14th of July the army moved towards Ossour, for the reduction of which place, four battering guns were taken from Bangalore. A brigade being pushed forward, on the 15th the enemy evacuated the place, which, although they had blown up one of the angle bastions, was still judged sufficiently strong to be garrisoned by a battalion of Sepoys.

This place, like almost every other fort we have met with in the country, was rebuilding on a plan of such solidity, as, if completed, would have made it no easy capture. It is small, but surrounded by a fine wet

ditch, and glacis, with two ramparts, the outer one complete, the towers only of the inner (which was the old fort) were finished, large, and well constructed; well situated, and on the whole is a most excellent post.

Leaving our heavy cannon here, we moved towards Ryacotta; a place which all the prisoners of last war, and all the ancient information obtained regarding this country in the wars of Smith and Wood, agreed in describing as perfectly commanding the great Pass, from the Barramaul valley to the upper country of Mysore. The advanced brigade, under Major Gowdie, attacked the place; and after carrying the lower and centre forts by assault, entered the higher ones by capitulation. The situation was extremely strong, but so far from commanding the gun pass, it was six miles from the road, and a difficult foot-path only went through the hills and woods, directly from hence to Kistnaghery. The best, and I am inclined to think, the only good gun-road (the ascent being so easy it does not merit the name of a pass) is that of Hoolydroog, Policode, or Santamarinhelly, which runs through a valley about six miles in width, and only impeded by jungle in some parts, which might easily be cut away. Not defended, but watched by a number of small hill forts, which, though sufficient to prevent the inhabitants from quitting the country, or goods entering it without paying the duties exacted by government, are not at all calculated to stop the progress of an hostile army, unless its force is entirely of horse; in which case, the nature of the country is very favourable to the resistance of even a small body of infantry.

These forts we soon got possession of, some were evacuated, others surrendered, and one which had the temerity to refuse to admit a party commanded by Colonel Maxwell, was carried by storm; so that Ryacotta, Kenchellydurg, Nulghery, Tyendroog, Hoolydroog, Chandrayndurg, and Rittingery, all castles, which though in themselves of no great moment,

would make a considerable figure in description, are either destroyed, or garrisoned by small parties of our troops. A gun road has been actually made with great labour by our pioneers, from Ryacotta into the Barra-maul, for the convenience of our convoys, &c. We are employing ourselves in movements, between Bangalore and the head of the passes, to procure forage, cover the communication with the Carnatic, and pass the time till the season admits a renewal of our enterprizes. Some parties have been sent to explore the hills, and search for passes to the southward; but have reached the Caverry without finding any opening of consequence. A small force of the enemy, with some guns, lately came down the southern passes, and crossing the Bowanny river, attacked Coimbettore. This place was garrisoned by a company of Topasses under Lieutenant Chalmers, with a detachment of Travancore Sepoys; but not being considered as tenable, he had directions to evacuate it when any force appeared against him; who, though without artillery, and ill provided with all ammunition, did not think it necessary to retreat. The enemy opened batteries against the fort, breached it, and stormed on the 11th of July; and notwithstanding the Travancorians were almost in a state of mutiny, and his ammunition was nearly expended, he received them so gallantly, that of 600 who formed the storming party, upwards of three hundred were killed in the fort and ditch, the rest fled; Major Cuppage having marched with great expedition from Palligatcherry to relieve the place, arrived just as the affair was over, drove the enemy from the pettah, and took their battering guns; a party had also destroyed their boats, and the river being swelled, we expect intelligence daily of their total destruction, as Major Cuppage was left in pursuit of them. Chalmers has gained much deserved applause, and high commendations are bestowed on the gallant conduct of an European, who, as captain, had

the command of the Travancore detachment. Another detachment under Kummur ul Deen Cawn, defeated about 300 of the Mahrattas, who were carelessly encamped in the Sera district; but excepting these, Tip-poo has made no exertions; his army daily decreasing in numbers, and in the greatest distress for provisions; is still at Seringapatam, where he is raising lines, and other works innumerable for its defence; all which we hear with pleasure, as it may persuade him to stand another attack, to the event of which we look forward with joyful expectation.

Camp near Bangalore, August 26th, 1791.

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